The convergence of presidential and parliamentary elections in France : analysis of systemic tendencies from the perspective of sixty years of the Fifth Republic by Jakubiak, Łukasz
Polish Political science Yearbook, vol. 48(1) (2019), pp. 135–154
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2019108 PL ISSN 0208-7375
www.czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/10-15804/ppsy
Łukasz Jakubiak
Jagiellonian University (Poland)
The Convergence of Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections in France:  
Analysis of Systemic Tendencies from the Perspective of Sixty Years 
of the Fifth Republic
Abstract: The paper deals with specific links between presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions in contemporary France. The main goal is to demonstrate that the timing of the two 
types of political events is a significant factor preserving the configuration of a pro-pres-
idential majority fact as one of the possible variants of French semi-presidentialism. This 
raises the question of the role of both elections as instruments for controlling the process of 
setting up a space of political rivalry that could be perceived as optimal from the viewpoint 
of ruling camps. The author analyses possibilities to provide the convergence of presidential 
and parliamentary elections under the conditions of a seven-year presidential term as well 
as after its shortening to five years in 2000. Hence, of particular importance is the impact 
of some mechanisms used in this field on the institutional logic of the French political sys-
tem. Specific application of constitutional tools and some normative changes introduced in 
previous years cause the extent of the aforementioned control to be now much greater than 
in the first decades of the Fifth Republic. Looking at the convergence of both types of elec-
tions from the perspective of the evolution of the existing political system, the author argues 
that it is legitimate to divide the whole period of the Fifth Republic into three sub-periods: 
1. the absence of electoral convergence (1958–1981); 2. partial electoral convergence (1981– 
–2002); full electoral convergence (since 2002). Due to the acceptance of the pro-presiden-
tial paradigm, the latter formula is now definitely preferred and supported by legal regula-
tions, which affects the flexibility of French semi-presidentialism (significantly reduced, but 
not fully eliminated, probability of cohabitation).
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Introductory Remarks
Irrespective of different research approaches, the French Fifth Republic’s system of govern-
ment is treated as a semi-presidential one (however, it should be indicated that the semi-
presidentialism in France is firmly rooted in a parliamentary model)1. There is no doubt 
that one of the constitutive features of semi-presidentialism is choosing the head of state by 
universal suffrage2. Thanks to universal presidential and parliamentary elections (at least 
the first chamber being a nationwide representation is chosen in this way), it creates the 
configuration of two politically important procedures, each of which directly affects the 
functioning of the entire system. In a semi-presidential model, which is the main reference 
in this study, each of these elections affects the political profile of one of the two segments 
of executive power. As a consequence, there is a situation in which both elections are, at 
least theoretically, largely autonomous, that is independent of one another. As a comparison, 
a completely different situation occurs in a pure parliamentary system in which the head 
1  However, some authors reject the term “semi-presidentialism” as such. According to Marie-Anne 
Cohendet, the contemporary French system of government still remains only one of the forms of a par-
liamentary regime. It is characterised by Cohendet as a birepresentative parliamentary regime (régime 
parlementaire birépresentatif), because the parliament and president are elected by popular vote (Cohendet, 
2002, p. 3–4). A similar approach is represented by Jean-Claude Colliard, who maintains that it is better 
to define the Fifth Republic’s system as a parliamentary regime with presidential correction (correctif 
présidentiel) than as a semi-presidential one. The cause lies in the fact that the latter is more related to 
rules of political game and the president’s ties with political parties than with purely institutional factors 
(Colliard, 1978, pp. 280–281). Anyway. because of a considerably enhanced position of the head of state 
as well as constitutional and extra-constitutional rules creating double political responsibility of the 
government (to the parliament and to the president), the Fifth Republic may reasonably be treated as 
a semi-presidential regime. This does not discredit, however, the genesis of the system, which lies with the 
Gaullist idea of reformed parliamentarianism. The aforementioned interpretations seem to assume that the 
foundation of a parliamentary model is the political responsibility of the government to the legislature, and 
any system that fulfils this condition can be legitimately treated as one of the forms of parliamentarianism.
2  It is a commonly accepted feature of this system, no matter how it is defined. Such an assumption can 
be found in the concept of semi-presidentialism presented by Maurice Duverger, which, according to him, 
the French government system became presidential only until the introduction of universal presidential 
elections in 1962, and previously it was a classical parliamentary system with a relatively strong presidential 
power (Duverger, 1974, p. 137). The same view was also expressed by Giovanni Sartori, who was of the 
opinion that under semi-presidentialism “the head of state (president) is elected by popular vote – either 
directly or indirectly – for a fixed term of office” (Sartori, 1997, p. 131). Robert Elgie, in turn, thinks that 
popular presidential elections should be a sufficient argument for recognizing a system of government 
based on a dualistic executive branch and the cabinet’s responsibility to the parliament for a semi-pre-
sidential one (Elgie, 2011, pp. 22–23). This last approach to this model shows, however, that there is no 
fundamental difference between semi-presidentialism defined in this way and a parliamentary system with 
a popularly elected head of state, however according to Elgie, if there are universal presidential elections 
inscribed in the constitutional structure, the latter regime stops automatically to be a parliamentary one).
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of state is elected by the parliament or by a special body built on the basis of the legislature 
(for example, a special electoral college composed not only of all parliamentarians but also 
of representatives of regional and local authorities). This means that the procedure applied 
to choose the head of state is more or less dependent on the previous decision of the elec-
torate taken in universal parliamentary elections. This is due to the fact that the most likely 
candidate for the presidency is always a candidate actively supported (or at least accepted) 
by a given parliamentary majority.
Hence, in a parliamentary system in which the head of state is not elected by universal 
suffrage, the parliament exerts a decisive impact on the political composition of the executive. 
As for the government, this influence is direct and, in the case of the president – direct or 
indirect (in the latter case, when the head of state is chosen not by the legislature itself but by 
a special electoral college). The application of universal presidential elections results in the 
lack of parliamentary control of this type over the presidency. Although the latter situation 
may take place in every system of government, it seems that in a semi-presidential model 
this has the most far-reaching political consequences. This is related to the fact that in this 
regime the president cannot be a figurehead3, but the executive power still remains dualistic. 
What should be highlighted is that semi-presidentialism fulfils both these conditions, while 
the other two basic systems of government – presidentialism and parliamentarianism – meet 
only one of them. The former regime assumes a powerful presidency but the executive 
power is monistic, while the latter is based on the executive composed of the president 
and the cabinet but the position of the head of state is usually considerably limited4. What 
is particularly important is that a semi-presidential model presupposing the existence of 
two executive bodies with similar political potential assumes not only the independence of 
presidential and parliamentary elections, but also their relative equality. As Olivier Duhamel 
and Guillaume Tusseau noted, the specificity of the French system lies in the dualism of two 
governmental elections (la dualité des élections gouvernementales), which means that both 
have a significant impact on the existence of the government (Duhamel and Tusseau, 2013, 
3  For this reason, the definition given by Elgie seems to be too liberal. Even if presidential powers are 
not taken into consideration while defining semi-presidentialism, the question of political responsibility 
of the cabinet should not be neglected. distinguishing feature of a semi-presidential model should be the 
assumption that there exists double governmental responsibility, that is the cabinet is politically responsible 
both to the parliament and to the head of state (it may be dismissed by the two organs independently), 
however in the latter case it does not have to be anchored in constitutional provisions, but it may also 
result from well-established political practice. It is the French case that may serve as the best example of 
such a partially constitutionalized formula of double political responsibility of the cabinet.
4  It is worth mentioning that in the case of a presidential model monism of the executive branch 
(based on strong presidential authority as well as on ministers which are politically subordinated solely to 
the head of state) results in the fact that parliamentary elections do not influence its political composition 
in any way. This proves a specific feature of presidentialism that is noticeable against the background of 
both semi-presidential and parliamentary systems.
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p. 436). Under such conditions, the two political events provide strong legitimacy to govern. 
This can bring far differentiated political effects. When presidential and parliamentary 
elections bring similar political outcomes, the configuration of a pro-presidential majority 
fact (fait majoritaire) emerges, that is the situation where the government has stable major-
ity in the National Assembly, and the president comes from the same political camp. This 
means convergence of the parliamentary majority and the so-called presidential majority 
(majorité présidentielle) built around voters that supported the incumbent head of state in 
the last presidential election (Gohin, 2013, pp. 604–608). Otherwise, the phenomenon of 
cohabitation occurs5. In the case of the Fifth Republic of France, these political configurations 
have become two contradictory constitutional variants, on the basis of which the French 
political system may function. The particular political significance of both elections leads to 
the fact that the timing in which they are held can significantly influence the entire political 
scene. Thus, it can be argued that presidential and parliamentary elections under the Fifth 
Republic have become a tool for achieving precise political effects.
In the first four decades of the Fifth Republic, the head of state was elected for a term 
that was two years longer than the term of office of the first chamber. However, the seven-
year presidential mandate began to be perceived as too long, and the strong position of the 
president was an argument for more frequent democratic control of the person occupying 
that office. On the other hand, the constitutional amendment of 2000 introducing a five-year 
presidential term was – as Jean-Éric Gicquel points out – marked by an anti-cohabitation 
way of thinking (une philosophie anti-cohabitationniste) (Gicquel, 2009, pp. 306–307). 
The modification was thus intended, inter alia, to consolidate the configuration of a pro-
presidential majority fact6. Such a result can be ensured by their partial or full convergence 
5  There is no single way of defining fait majoritaire in French literature. Gohin treats the majority 
fact as the opposite of cohabitation in which the president does not come from the political camp created 
by the parliamentary majority. In this context, Duhamel and Tusseau use the term “presidential fact” 
(fait présidentiel) (Duhamel and Tusseau, 2013, pp. 434–435). In turn, Jean Gicquel and Jean-Éric Gicquel 
believe that the majority fact means that a stable majority in the National Assembly is at the disposal of the 
executive, which may be the president or prime minister, depending on the existing political configuration. 
Thus, the majority fact understood in this way does not interfere with the phenomenon of cohabitation 
(Gicquel and Gicquel, 2015, p. 511). 
6  It should be noted that similar proposals of constitutional amendments were formulated in previous 
decades of the Fifth Republic but did not come into force until the reform of 2000. Various systemic 
factors were then considered. It deserves to be stressed that the initiative formulated in 1969 by Alexandre 
Sanguinetti, a Gaullist deputy, aimed at introducing a five-year presidential term, but it was not intended 
to link presidential and parliamentary elections. It was argued that the disruption of synergy between 
them could still be caused by dissolution of the parliament (Bigaut, 2000, pp. 89–90). As it turns out, the 
presidential power to dissolve the legislature was then perceived as a serious systemic obstacle, and not as 
a chance to restore a pro-presidential majority fact. It should be borne in mind, however, that the proposal 
was formulated long before the lasting domination of centre-right parties was cut short due to the first 
election defeat in 1981.
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(when both elections are carried out one after the other in a short period of time). The 
aforementioned synergy may result solely from political actions or be subject to special 
legal regulations. Both dimensions of electoral convergence can also complement each other. 
The political and legal component of this original systemic phenomenon remains directly 
related to the length of the presidential term. Its shortening from seven to five years in 2000 
can be considered as an important caesura. It can be argued that before the adoption of the 
appropriate constitutional amendment, strictly political strategies mattered (the dissolution 
of the National Assembly unrelated to conflicts between the government and the parliament, 
where the head of state may act as an arbitrator). Two cases of dissolution in the 1980s (1981 
and 1988) shows that this tool can be used to choose the majority supporting the president 
who comes from the opposition political camp, that is, to prevent a conflict that does not 
exist yet (Devedeix-Margueritat, 2001, pp. 60–61).
After adopting constitutional and statutory modifications of 2000–2001 presidential 
and parliamentary elections started to be held automatically in close intervals. However, the 
electoral convergence understood in this way cannot be treated in the same way as conduct-
ing presidential and parliamentary elections at exactly the same time, which is the case of 
typical presidential systems. First of all, the sequence, and not simultaneity, of the French 
elections is of fundamental significance. The result of presidential elections is not without 
effect on the result of parliamentary ones, although of course it does not guarantee the 
choice of the same political option. Secondly, in the case of semi-presidentialism (in which 
the president may have the prime minister as a political opponent) a stable pro-presidential 
parliamentary majority is much more important for the head of state than in a presidential 
model (Lauvaux, 2002, pp. 3–8). According to Guy Carcassonne and Marc Guillaume, parlia-
mentary elections give real power, whereas the victory in presidential ones only creates the 
basis for it (in their view, this should be regarded as an argument for a parliamentary, and 
not presidential or even semi-presidential profile of the Fifth Republic) (Carcassonne and 
Guillaume, 2016, p. 62). Such circumstances constitute one of the fundamental differences 
between the so-called presidentialist political practice of the Fifth Republic and institutional 
mechanisms of a typical presidential model. The former must in every case be built on the 
majority in the National Assembly, which emerges after the parliamentary elections. Hence, 
“presidentialism” in the context of both systems means something completely different and is 
achieved by other means. The convergence of both elections in the French semi-presidential 
regime can be treated as one of such instruments.
The above-described research assumptions affect the structure of the paper and its 
methodological aspects. After presenting general comments on the role and specifics of 
elections within the French semi-presidentialism, further four parts of the paper relate to 
some particular features of pro-presidential approach to the 1958 Constitution and include 
a more detailed analysis of the sixty-year history of the Fifth Republic perceived from the 
point of view of connections between presidential and parliamentary elections. The distinc-
tion of some sub-periods in the functioning of the current regime assumes that there have 
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been three consecutive formulas applied in political practice: 1) full independence of both 
elections (1958–1981); 2) partial convergence of both elections due to presidential deci-
sions taken depending on the political situation (1981–2002); 3) full electoral convergence 
provided by deliberately adopted normative changes (since 2002). From the methodological 
point of view, main reference points in this study are both the constitutional structure of 
the system of government and some relevant mechanisms applied in practice to ensure 
precisely determined political effects. In general, the tendency to link both presidential and 
parliamentary elections should be seen through the prism of specific institutional engineer-
ing. Thus, in the analysis of the indicated periods particular emphasis is placed on the dates 
of both types of elections and the time which elapses between them. This creates the basis 
for discussing the scale of the electoral arrhythmia, various factors that may contribute to 
its emergence, as well as tools used to eliminate this phenomenon in recent decades.
The Pro-Presidential Interpretation of the 1958 Constitution as the 
Background of the Phenomenon of Electoral Convergence
As indicated above, the specific feature of the constitutional system of the Fifth Republic is 
that the Constitution of 4 October, 1958 (Constitution du 4 octobre 1958), which lies at its 
basis, has turned out to be a very flexible legal act. Such flexibility means susceptibility to 
different possible interpretations of its fundamental provisions concerning relationships 
within the dualistic executive branch and the latter’s links with the parliament as a body that 
provides political support to the government7. It should be borne in mind that the regime 
defined by the 1958 Constitution, although today it is referred to as a semi-presidential one, 
remains firmly anchored in a highly rationalised parliamentary model in which the role 
of the president lies more in political arbitration than in real leadership marginalising the 
cabinet and the prime minister as its chief. This approach to the appropriate constitutional 
regulations can be called pro-parliamentary, because it emphasizes significance of funda-
mental institutional mechanisms based on a parliamentary model. The most important 
component of such an interpretation is the government’s political responsibility to the 
parliament and the rejection of the possibility for the head of state to dismiss the govern-
ment on the president’s own initiative and without taking into consideration the prime 
minister’s point of view. This assumption is fully confirmed in Article 8 of the Constitution, 
but the political practice fixed under subsequent years of the Fifth Republic have gone in 
a completely different direction (which, however, does not apply to periods of cohabitation) 
(Avril, 1997, p. 84).
7  As Martin Carrier pointed out, the institutions of the Fifth Republic were very flexible, reacting to 
external factors, although important formal changes in the legal order were not – with a few exceptions 
– carried out (Carrier, 2016, p. 22).
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In turn, the pro-presidential interpretation of the constitutional order presupposes 
that there is a hierarchy within the executive branch which consists in subordinating 
the government to the head of state8. The recognition of such a role of the cabinet means 
that the body bears political responsibility before the president, although this approach 
is not sufficiently supported by the 1958 Constitution. Hence, the pro-presidential politi-
cal practice has led to the formation of double responsibility, which is still not formally 
regulated (solely the one before the parliament has been foreseen in the Constitution). 
This is the reason why under conditions of a majority fact, the actual position of the head 
of state seems to be much stronger than it results from the relevant constitutional provi-
sions. Only the occurrence of cohabitation may be treated as at least partial return to the 
1958 Constitution perceived through the prism of its letter, and not of its hardly definable 
spirit. The consequence of this pro-parliamentary perspective is even the conclusion that 
under political homogeneity of the executive power (outside cohabitation), constitutional 
regulations concerning the structure of the adopted system of government are not observed 
(Cohendet, 1999, pp. 33–57). 
The mechanisms underlying the evidently pro-presidential interpretation of the Constitu-
tion have been perpetuated over time, and cohabitation understood as forced abandonment 
of such a pro-presidential approach can only be regarded as an exception that confirms the 
rule. From today’s point of view, it can be said that the paradigm of presidentialism remains 
deeply rooted in the Fifth Republic (it started to be applied in practice at the beginning of 
the 60. whereas the configuration of politically inhomogeneous executive power emerged 
only in 1986, thus over a quarter of a century after the adoption of the 1958 Constitution). 
The disclosure of the two political situations indicated above as well as of the paradigms that 
provided their constitutional justification cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that both 
are preferred or rejected to the same extent. The variant considered the most effective is the 
structure of a pro-presidential majority fact, while cohabitation seems to be perceived as 
a political and institutional scheme possessing much more disadvantages than advantages. 
After the period of frequent phases of cohabitation in the 1980s and 1990s (1986–1988, 
1993–1995, 1997–2002) it became obvious that maintaining the formula of presidential 
domination, and consequently also preferring the pro-presidential interpretation of the 
Constitution, required certain constitutional and even statutory changes, such as shorten-
ing the presidential mandate from seven to five years and reversing the electoral calendar 
(presidential elections were to take place before parliamentary ones, and never directly 
after them). Due to the dissolution of the parliament by President Jacques Chirac in 1997, 
the convergence of both elections was to appear exactly five years later, but the order in 
8  Such a concept of relations within the executive was presented by President de Gaulle during a press 
conference of January 31, 1964, when he pointed to the dependence of the government on the president, 
indicating that the head of state alone can decide on the cabinet’s further existence. In this way, he ques-
tioned his own opinion formulated while working on the 1958 Constitution (Debré, 1974, pp. 275–277).
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which they were to take place would be in contradiction with pro-presidential mechanisms 
of the functioning of the Fifth Republic (Lauvaux, 2002, p. 89). In other words, a constant 
relationship was to be established between the two elections, so that the majority of voters 
participating in them could thus confirm their attachment to a newly elected president, just 
as they did before the first cohabitation took place (Hamon and Troper, 2005, p. 581).
All in all, the above-indicated reforms of 2000–2001 were intended to maintain the 
enhanced political position of the head of state within the French semi-presidential regime. 
This was supposed to cause the neutralisation of those components of the system of govern-
ment that are taken from a parliamentary model, and which were revealed most strongly 
in the conditions of cohabitation. It may be said that the French concept of presidentialism 
implemented in practice, and not guaranteed in the text of the Constitution, assumes that 
the presidential election is the main axis of the political division between two separate 
camps, on the basis of which the parliamentary elections are carried out (Chantebout, 
2004, p. 200). Such adaptation of institutional mechanisms to expected political outcomes 
can be seen through the prism of the phenomenon of specific constitutional engineering 
(Jakubiak, 2016, pp. 424–432). In this way, the risk of another period of cohabitation has 
been clearly minimised, though due to the preservation of a semi-presidential system and 
the duality of the executive power consisting of two strong segments, such a scenario can-
not be completely ruled out. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that from today’s perspective 
cohabitation is regarded as a systemic anomaly. This in turn means that some mechanisms 
of the aforementioned constitutional engineering severely limit the exceptional flexibility of 
the current system of government. Hence, a pro-presidential majority fact and cohabitation 
cannot be treated as two equal variants of the practice of the Fifth Republic. Simply the 
former is now much more preferred than the latter.
The Absence of Electoral Convergence under the Configuration  
of a Pro-Presidential Majority Fact before 1981
Before the presidential term was shortened to five years in 2000, presidential and parlia-
mentary elections had been independent of each other. This means that they were not 
a deliberately designed series of two elections, conducted either jointly or in succession. It 
is worth noting that until 1981, presidential and parliamentary elections never took place in 
the same year (not counting the ones held at the threshold of the Fifth Republic). The former 
took place in 1958 (the head of state was then elected by a special electoral college composed 
of about 80,000 electors), 1965, 1969, 1974, and the latter in 1958, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1973, 
1978 (Bréchon, 2003, p. 241). Apart from the elections organised at the beginning of the 
Fifth Republic, all parliamentary elections listed above were held in the course of ongoing 
presidential terms, thus not immediately after the head of state was chosen (interestingly, 
the 1958 presidential elections were held four weeks after the parliamentary ones). After 
1958 the phases between presidential and parliamentary elections were of varying length 
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and ranged from eleven months to nearly four years which proved that the periodically 
repeating schema did not actually exist (Duhamel, 2000, pp. 31–35).
It should be mentioned that the timing of elections resulting from the constitutional 
term of office was then disturbed several times. The causes were the dissolution of parlia-
ment (1962 and 1968), the resignation of the president (1969) and the death of the head of 
state during the presidential term (1974) (Lavroff, 1999, pp. 322, 324, 359, 363). Even the 
frequent disruption of the constant rhythm of presidential elections (every seven years) 
and parliamentary ones (every five years) did not contribute, however, to ensuring their 
convergence understood as conducting the latter directly after the former. Incidentally, 
mechanisms based on popular voting were applied that way in 1962. In this case, however, 
parliamentary elections were not preceded by presidential ones but by a referendum on 
introducing universal elections of the head of state (initiated by President de Gaulle)9.
Table 1. Presidential and parliamentary elections in France 1958–1981
Date of elections Time elapsed between consecutive elections
1. November 23th and 30th, 1958 (parliamentary)
2. December 21th, 1958 (presidential)
3. November 18th and 25th, 1962 (parliamentary)
4. December 5th and 19th, 1965 (presidential)
5. March, 5th and 12th, 1967 (parliamentary)
6. June 23rd and 30th, 1968 (parliamentary)
7. June 1st and 15th, 1969 (presidential)
8. March 4th and 11th, 1973 (parliamentary)
9. May 5th and 19th, 1974 (presidential)
10. March 12th and 19th, 1978 (parliamentary)
11. April 26th and May 10th, 1981 (presidential)
-
28 days
3 years, 10 months, 28 days
3 years, 10 days
1 year, 2 months, 17 days
1 year, 3 months, 11 days
11 months, 1 day
3 years, 8 months, 19 days
1 year, 1 month, 25 days
3 years, 9 months, 24 days
3 years, 1 month, 7 days
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Duhamel, 2000, pp. 31–35; Bréchon, 2003, p. 241.
It deserves to be emphasized that in the period preceding the first electoral victory of 
the left (1981), the configuration of a pro-presidential majority fact persisted without the 
need for any corrective mechanisms to ensure the convergence of both types of elections. 
The parliamentary ones held in the 1960s and 1970s always brought victories of a political 
camp whose main component was the Gaullist party (Pactet and Mélin-Soucramanien, 2007, 
p. 405). Under such conditions, the dissolution of the National Assembly to carry out early 
9  The 1962 early parliamentary election resulted from the dissolution of parliament by President 
de Gaulle, who decided to take such a step because of the adoption of a motion of censure against the 
government headed by Georges Pompidou. The referendum conducted in the meantime (formally initiated 
by the government who was therefore overthrown by the passing of the vote of no confidence) gave 
support to the presidential option, constituting a kind of trampoline used during the aforementioned 
parliamentary elections by the camp built around the then head of state (Jakubiak, 2012, pp. 237–241; 
Debbasch et al., 1988, pp. 30–31).
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legislative elections immediately after presidential ones would have had no justification. The 
absence of the aforementioned synergy cannot, however, lead to the conclusion that during 
this period such political events did not play specific functions inscribed in the logic of the 
pro-presidential interpretation of the 1958 Constitution. What should be highlighted is that 
after 1962, the paradigm of presidentialism was influenced by important political effects of 
the appropriate electoral procedures. They generally served to uphold the pro-presidential 
approach to existing political institutions implemented under the configuration of a majority 
fact supporting the entire executive branch. Taking into consideration the whole period 
under discussion, it can be stated that the importance of presidential elections for the 
structure of the French party system grew significantly. This is due to the fact that they are 
carried out in two rounds. The second one, with only the two candidates obtaining the highest 
support in the first round, contributes to the polarisation of the political scene, which is 
then reflected at the level of the National Assembly. Hence, such variables as the existence, 
structure and durability of major political camps, which determine the arena of party rivalry, 
depend largely on specific results of presidential elections (Chantebout, 1992, pp. 56–57; 
Cole, 2003, pp. 12–13). Moreover, the election of the head of state by popular vote enabled 
the reorganization of the most important political forces behind party leaders participating 
in them, as demonstrated by the first such elections of 1965 (Bréchon and Denni, 2013, p. 
26). All in all, choosing the head of the state by popular vote caused presidential majorities 
(revealed and consolidated thanks to such a procedure) to affect the political dimension 
of newly-created configurations in the legislature, favouring the formula of a long-term 
pro-presidential majority fact as one of the two possible political variants under the Fifth 
Republic (Lavroff, 1999, pp. 942–943).
On the other hand, under the conditions of presidential domination before 1981, the 
position of the ruling camp was so stabilised that even parliamentary elections held after 
a long time that had elapsed since presidential ones did not bring the opposition’s victory. 
This happened for the first time only in 1986 – after 28 years of the Fifth Republic – and 
marked the beginning of the first period of cohabitation (Lavroff, 1999, pp. 378–384). It is 
worth noting, however, that the first delegitimisation of the political camp that had been 
in power since the beginning of the Fifth Republic was the result of the electoral victory 
of François Mitterrand five years earlier, in 1981. What should be stressed is that this took 
place during presidential elections, not parliamentary ones. Before 1981, such a weakening 
of the ruling party occurred only once, in the referendum regarding the reform of the Senate 
conducted at the initiative of President de Gaulle in 1969. Following its disadvantageous 
outcomes, the head of state resigned, which resulted in early presidential elections (Cheval-
lier et al., 2007, pp. 150–160; Garrigues, 2008, pp. 23–25). This, however, did not affect the 
political composition existing in the National Assembly. According to the then electoral 
calendar, next parliamentary elections were to be held only in 1973, a year before another 
universal vote on the presidency. In the light of the above, there is no doubt that under such 
circumstances the absence of the electoral convergence was not an obstacle in maintaining 
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a pro-presidential majority fact as the most beneficial variant (from the point of view of the 
ruling camp regardless of its political profile) of the French political system.
Partial Convergence of Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the 
Conditions of High Electoral Volatility (1981–2001)
It was only in 1981 that a specific constitutional mechanism was intentionally used to allow 
both types of elections to be carried out within a relatively short space of time. The cause 
lay in the fact that in the early 1980s the then opposition candidate, François Mitterrand, 
won presidential elections. Under the period of the Fifth Republic, such a situation had not 
happened before10. As a result, the newly-elected president decided to conduct early elec-
tions to the National Assembly. Thanks to the dissolution of the first chamber, it was possible 
to obtain additional benefits from the victory of the socialist candidate in the presidential 
elections held a few weeks earlier. The anticipated effect of the application of Article 12 of 
the Constitution was a fundamental change in the political configuration of the National 
Assembly. It should be remembered that the pro-government and pro-presidential parlia-
mentary majority existing in both chambers before the 1981 double elections provided the 
centre-right camp with a particularly favourable formula of a majority fact. The latter effect 
could be achieved only in the 1970s, when the centrist formations, which were not politi-
cally connected with the Gaullist camp, ceased to dominate in the Senate. As a consequence, 
the French second chamber of that time began to provide the entire executive branch with 
stable and predictable support, which was comparable to that existing in the first chamber, 
and even the political composition of the Senate was somewhat more favourable from the 
presidential point of view (Mastias, 1999, pp. 170–171). For this reason, the aforementioned 
dissolution of the National Assembly could be treated as an attempt to increase, at least 
partially, the political resources of the newly elected head of state (it should be added that 
due to the inability to dissolve the second chamber and the electoral procedures used, the 
Senate was out of reach)11. The 1981 triumph of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) showed 
10  Although in 1974 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a candidate from outside the Gaullist camp, defeated the 
left-wing candidate François Mitterrand in the second round and became a new president of the Republic, 
his own political party had belonged to the presidential majority existing under the presidency of Georges 
Pompidou (1969–1974). This meant that no cohabitation began in 1974 and the pro-presidential majority 
fact continued. However, the first government of that time was headed by Jacques Chirac who was the then 
leader of the Gaullist political formation (Debbasch et al., 1988, pp. 39–46). Thus, both political leaders 
did not represent the same segment of the centre-right ruling camp.
11  Such an action cannot be regarded as a manifestation of political arbitration of the president 
intervening only if there is a dysfunctional political conflict which he himself is not a party to. In the French 
case, the head of state undoubtedly lacked political neutrality or at least a distance to other authorities. 
It deserves to be stressed that the latter feature underlies not a typical parliamentary model based on 
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that the maverick decision taken by President Mitterrand proved successful. However, it 
does not change the fact that the intentional convergence of both elections did not become 
a permanent political phenomenon. The reason for this was that terms of office of the head 
of state and of the National Assembly did not overlap. Almost simultaneous 1981 presidential 
and parliamentary elections meant that the next elections to the first chamber were to take 
place two years before the end of the term of office of the then incumbent head of state (or 
even earlier – if the National Assembly had been previously dissolved). The parliamentary 
elections of 1986 and 1993 proved that this resulted in a significant weakening of the adopted 
vision of presidency. The head of state was then forced to operate for a few years under dif-
ficult conditions of cohabitation.
Table 2. Presidential and parliamentary elections in France 1981–2002
Date of elections Time elapsed between consecutive elections
1. April 26th and May 10th, 1981 (presidential)
2. June 14th and 21st, 1981 (parliamentary)
3. March 16th, 1986 (parliamentary)
4. April 24th and May 8th, 1988 (presidential)
5. June 5th and 12th, 1988 (parliamentary)
6. March 21st and 28th, 1993 (parliamentary)
7. April 23rd and May 7th, 1995 (presidential)
8. May 25th and June 1st, 1997 (parliamentary)
9. April 21st and May 5th, 2002 (presidential)
-
1 month, 4 days
4 years, 8 months, 25 days
2 years, 1 month, 8 days
28 days
4 years, 9 months, 9 days
2 years, 26 days
2 years, 18 days
4 years, 10 months, 20 days
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Duhamel, 2000, pp. 31–35; Bréchon, 2003, p. 242.
However, the above-described practice of dissolving the legislature immediately after 
the presidential elections was used only in the 1980s. It was at that time that the National 
Assembly was dissolved twice to bring together the two elections, the expected consequence 
of which was to be the political identity of the presidential majority and the parliamentary 
one (Elgie, 1993, p. 11). In the 1990s, the first chamber was dissolved only once. Although, like 
in the two previous cases, the goal was to create such a parliamentary majority that would 
foster the head of state, the electoral convergence was out of the question. This was due to the 
fact that President Chirac applied Article 12 of the Constitution only at the end of the second 
year of his presidential term, and not at its very beginning. Unlike in 1981 and 1988, after 
the 1995 presidential elections, the dissolution of the National Assembly was not a necessary 
condition for restoring the political identity of the head of state and the majority in the first 
chamber. Such an effect did not have to be caused by dissolution of the legislature, because it 
arose from the 1995 victory of Jacques Chirac who was presented as a candidate of the camp 
controlling the then centre-right parliamentary majority. Therefore, the application of the 
neutralised presidency, but its most far-reaching pro-presidential modifications which cause the head of 
state to be a relevant political actor striving to pursue his own political interests (Jakubiak, 2013, pp. 62–64).
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aforementioned corrective mechanism to maintain and consolidate the same political profile 
of presidential and parliamentary majorities would be subject to a particular risk without 
any satisfactory benefits. Hence, it is not surprising that the parliament was dissolved not 
in 1995, but only in 1997, that is one year before the parliamentary elections scheduled for 
1998. The step taken by President Chirac was then perceived as a preventive measure that 
would hinder the creation of an electoral coalition of left-wing parties (under the leadership 
of the Socialist Party headed by Lionel Jospin) known as the plural left (gauche plurielle) 
(Hanley, 2003, pp. 78–81). However, such expectations turned out to be completely wrong, 
and the 1997 dissolution led to another period of cohabitation, this time lasting five years 
(until the end of the seven-year presidential term) (Bellon, 2008. pp. 54–56).
It should also be noted that the electoral convergence was missing in the first half of 
the 1990s. As a result of the 1988 dissolution of the legislature by a re-elected head of state, 
parliamentary elections took place after five years, and subsequent presidential ones only two 
years later. This meant a similar scenario to that known from the years 1986–1988 when the 
first cohabitation occurred. Hence, the synergy of elections in the analysed period consisted 
primarily in particular influence exerted by a newly-elected (or re-elected) president. Any-
way, such partial electoral convergence (only in the initial phase of this period) contributed 
to the reduction of the pre-1981 arrhythmia. It is due to the fact that in the remaining cases 
nationwide elections (presidential or parliamentary) took place every five or two years, 
which lasted until 2002 (Duhamel, 2000, p. 34). The scenario of “five years of a majority fact, 
followed by two years of cohabitation” was repeated in the same form during Mitterrand’s 
second term of office, and during Chirac’s first term it underwent a certain modification 
taking the form of “two years of a majority fact, followed by five years of cohabitation”. On 
the other hand, due to quite high electoral volatility of that time that led to frequent changes 
in the ruling parties (each parliamentary election of 1981–2002 resulted in the fact that the 
camp in power went to the opposition), the possibility of consolidating a pro-presidential 
majority fact turned out to be very limited. During these two decades, however, there were 
no other factors than the dissolution of the legislature that would shorten presidential or 
parliamentary terms. Compared to the previous period, it was a significant difference.
Full Convergence of Presidential and Parliamentary Elections after 
Shortening the Term of the Head of State to Five Years (Since 2002)
Another type of convergence of presidential and parliamentary elections took place in 2002. 
Because of 1997 dissolution of the first chamber, both political events were to occur in the 
same year. In this context, however, particular attention should be paid to the organic law 
of May 15, 2001 that changed the date of elections to the National Assembly (Loi organique 
no 2001–419 du 15 mai 2001 modifiant la date d’expiration des pouvoirs de l’Assemblée 
nationale). Without adopting the legal act, the 2002 parliamentary elections would have 
been held before the presidential ones scheduled for the same year. The reason lay in the 
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aforementioned dissolution of parliament by President Chirac in 1997. Considering the 
dominant pro-presidential paradigm and the need to maintain this approach to the 1958 
Constitution, it is not surprising that such a situation would have been unacceptable. It was 
assumed that the reverse order of both elections would contribute to the weakening of the 
presidency based not only on the Constitution itself, but above all on its pro-presidential 
interpretation. In the light of this view, the lack of reaction to the anticipated political effects 
of the 1997 dissolution could be regarded as a de facto rejection, or at least a significant un-
dermining of the whole Gaullist constitutional project. It is due to the fact that, the head of 
state would have then much less influence on the appointment of the head of government, 
and thus on the functioning of the executive branch (Philip, 2008, p. 425). It can be assumed 
that in such conditions voters participating in presidential elections would be guided by the 
results of earlier parliamentary ones. The latter elections would shape the political profile 
of the presidency, which would lower the actual position of the head of state. It cannot be 
ruled out that the president would only become a member of the ruling camp, whose real 
leader would be the prime minister (if there were no cohabitation).
Again, as far as the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections are concerned, their 
convergence and the planned electoral order resulted directly from previously adopted modi-
fications, and not from the application of Article 12 of the 1958 Constitution as a special tool 
for correcting the electoral calendar to achieve concrete political goals. Of key significance 
was then the introduction of a five-year term of the head of state. The constitutional act was 
passed in the referendum held on September 24, 2000 (Loi constitutionnelle no 2000–964 du 2 
octobre 2000 relative à la durée du mandat du Président de la République). This has practically 
removed the problem of possible cohabitation in the last two years of the presidency that 
could happen if opposition parties to the head of state won parliamentary elections after 
five years of holding the presidential office, so when the president – unlike directly after 
presidential elections – has no political position to undermine voters’ decision. Although 
the dissolution of the National Assembly immediately after parliamentary elections which 
do not result from earlier dissolution of this body (at least one year must elapse from the 
previous elections, so that the parliament can be dissolved again) is not prohibited by the 
Constitution, but it would have no rational justification from the point of view of democratic 
rivalry and could be treated as politically unacceptable.
From today’s perspective, it can be stated that the specific electoral convergence has 
already become a relatively permanent and well-established political phenomenon, which 
is confirmed by presidential and parliamentary elections carried out in the years 2002, 2007, 
2012 and 2017 (the latter conducted always a few weeks after the former). This meant the 
elimination of the specific electoral arrhythmia existing in France before the introduction of 
the five-year term of office of the head of state (Duhamel and Tusseau, 2013, pp. 561–562). 
What seems to be particularly important is that this rhythm of both elections held every 
five years since 2002 has not been disturbed in any way so far. The factors that could pos-
sibly cause, at least for some time, such an effect are resignation, dismissal or death of the 
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incumbent president (disruption of the five-year term of the head of state), as well as the 
dissolution of the National Assembly (disruption of the five-year term of the first chamber) 
(Cohendet, 2002, pp. 29). On the other hand, the latter tool can also be used as a means of 
restoring the electoral synergy after an early termination of the five-year presidential term, 
which suggests that the entire system still retains the ability to return to its pro-presidential 
structure (none of the parliamentary elections held until immediately after the presidential 
election have led to cohabitation, although such a scenario is not entirely unlikely). In this 
way, the disrupted convergence of both elections could easily be restored, and the effects 
of such a step would also be visible in the further future (repeating such a sequence of 
presidential and parliamentary elections after exactly five years).
Table 3. Presidential and parliamentary elections in France since 2002
Date of elections Time elapsed between consecutive elections
1. April 21st and May 5th, 2002 (presidential)
2. June 9th and 16th, 2002 (parliamentary)
3. April 22nd and May 6th, 2007 (presidential)
4. June 10th and 17th, 2007 (parliamentary)
5. April 22nd and May 6th, 2012 (presidential)
6. June 10th and 17th, 2012 (parliamentary)
7. April 23rd and May 7th, 2017 (presidential)
8. June 11th and 18th, 2017 (parliamentary)
-
1 month, 4 days
4 years, 10 months, 6 days
1 month, 4 days
4 years, 10 months, 5 days
1 month, 4 days
4 years, 10 months, 6 days
1 month, 4 days
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Duhamel, 2000, pp. 31–35; Les élections en France. Les résultats. Ministère 
de l’Intérieur. Retrieved from: https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats.
Thus, analysing presidential and parliamentary elections conducted in the first two dec-
ades of the 21st century, special attention should be paid to the effects of choosing a particular 
presidential candidate for the later political composition of the first chamber. Chirac’s victory 
in 2002 was confirmed by the success of the Gaullist party in the parliamentary elections 
held a few weeks later. It is worth emphasizing that this political formation was then known 
as the Union for the Presidential Majority (Union pour la majorité présidentielle). This was 
a coalition of several centre-right parties that united to create a pro-presidential political 
environment in the National Assembly (Agrikoliansky, 2008, pp. 106–108). After the 2002 
presidential and parliamentary elections, a cohesive presidential party emerged (the Union 
for a Popular Movement – Union pour un mouvement populaire), which affected the relation-
ship between the legislative and executive centred around the head of state (Lazardeux, 
2010, p. 52). Five years later, the same political formation provided parliamentary support 
to Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency. Both in 2002 and in 2007, strong centre-right majorities 
were established in the first chamber. The fundamental change of political configuration 
took place only in 2012, when François Hollande took the presidency, and the Socialist 
Party gained the most seats in the parliamentary elections conducted a few weeks later (the 
absolute presidential majority was then formed with the participation of smaller left-wing 
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groups) (Thevenon, 2016, pp. 245–255). The result of both elections was therefore a total 
alternation of power (both in its presidential and parliamentary dimension)12.
In turn, the 2017 double elections can be considered exceptional because they have 
interrupted the rivalry between centre-right and left-wing political camps built respectively 
around the neo-Gaullist party which has been functioning since 2015 as the Republicans (Les 
Républicains) and the Socialist Party as the main formation of the French left. Emmanuel 
Macron’s victory in the 2017 presidential elections has allowed for at least partial but not nec-
essarily long-lasting reconstruction of the political area between both aforementioned party 
blocks13. Such a conclusion comes from the results of the 2017 parliamentary elections held 
after the presidential ones. The absolute majority of seats has been granted to the Republic 
Onwards! (La République En Marche!) – a political party founded a year earlier to support 
Macron as a presidential candidate. It should be mentioned that he decided to compete 
for the presidency independently of the Socialist Party with which he had been previously 
associated as a member of François Hollande’s political camp (Evans and Ivaldi, 2018, pp. 
79–82). The convergence of both types of election has therefore been subjected to a specific 
test. As it has turned out, the victory of the candidate from outside the two main political 
camps did not prevent the creation of a strong pro-presidential majority in the first chamber, 
even though the political background of the newly elected president was not established. 
Thus, the position of the two main parties at the parliamentary level has been significantly 
reduced (the Republic Onwards! took over 300 mandates in the first chamber, whereas the 
Republicans and the Socialist Party together – less than 150). Hence, as far as the role of the 
above-discussed convergence for maintaining the pro-presidential constitutional paradigm 
is concerned, from the perspective of the last four double presidential and parliamentary 
elections (2002–2017), it can be said that this electoral test was passed every time.
Conclusions
The most important institutional component thanks to which the effect of full convergence 
can be achieved and consolidated, is the introduction of a five-year presidential term (pre-
ceded by the introduction – almost four decades earlier – of universal presidential elec-
tions), which is the same as the term of office of the first chamber. The same can be said 
12  It is worth mentioning that the alternation of power which is only partial (as exemplified by the 1986 
elections to the National Assembly) leads to the emergence of cohabitation (Quermonne, 2003, pp. 88–102). 
As political practice has shown, such an alternation takes place only after parliamentary elections because 
after presidential ones newly-elected presidents enjoy a special legitimacy to dissolve the first chamber, 
which creates a very high probability of choosing a pro-presidential political option in the legislature.
13  In the early years of the Fifth Republic, this part of the political scene was occupied by some smaller 
centre parties existing in the first decades of the Fifth Republic, but the process of polarisation caused 
them to disappear as relevant idenpedent formations (Agrikoliansky, 2008, pp. 111–113).
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about the aforementioned modification of the electoral calendar, however this reform did 
not require a constitutional amendment14. Other factors can be considered important but 
secondary. Their significance boils down to reinforcing the pro-presidential practice of 
exercising power, which in turn has an impact on the electoral convergence itself. From this 
point of view, special attention should be paid to the right of the head of state to dissolve 
the National Assembly being the only chamber before which the government is politically 
responsible. The role of this factor was particularly important before the reform of 2000. 
Under conditions of so-called alternance periods (launched in 1981) when various political 
camps were alternately going to the opposition or holding government posts (Quermonne, 
2003, pp. 76–88; Castagnez, 2008, pp. 31–34), the dissolution of the legislature served as 
the basic corrective mechanism preventing the emergence of cohabitation in the aftermath 
of presidential elections, but after shortening the presidential term to five years, the factor 
in question has clearly lost its previous importance. If parliamentary elections are carried 
out each time immediately after presidential ones and bring the results expected by the 
political camp supporting the head of state, the use of the tool regulated in Article 12 of the 
constitution is unnecessary and even undesirable. Its most far-reaching effect could be, at 
most, the disruption of convergence of both elections leading to a significant increase in 
the risk of another period of cohabitation.
It is also difficult to overestimate the mere priority of presidential elections over parlia-
mentary ones. In such a situation the latter may serve mainly to confirm the outcomes of the 
former. In accordance with the pro-presidential constitutional paradigm, the main task of 
the parliamentary majority in the National Assembly is thus to enable the implementation 
of the political programme presented by the head of state. Such priority of presidential 
elections was clearly visible in the period before 2000, although in this case it did not result 
from a deliberate change of the then electoral calendar, but from the fact that the 1981 and 
1988 early parliamentary elections were ordered by the head of state enjoying fresh political 
legitimacy received in the elections held under universal suffrage. This means that before 
the changes of 2000–2001, the French system of government was not forced to function 
under the full independence of both elections. The dissolution of the National Assembly, 
although the constitutional regulation of the appropriate presidential power is very beneficial 
to the head of state, had, however, clearly delineated boundaries. When the president was 
elected for seven years, the dissolution constituted an imperfect tool to ensure a long-lasting 
pro-presidential majority fact. In turn, after shortening the presidential term that allows 
14  It is worth mentioning that of all the constitutional changes that had been made prior to the 
extensive constitutional reform of 2008, only universal presidential elections (introduced in 1962 and 
applied for the first time in 1965) and a five-year presidential term (introduced in 2000 and applied for 
the first time in 2002) are recognized as modifications that have contributed significantly to the lasting 
pro-presidential reorientation of the regime during the Fifth Republic (Levade, 2010, pp. 231–232). 
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automatically created convergence of both elections, it turned out that this mechanism is 
no longer needed, or at least as long as none of the terms is interrupted.
In the light of the above findings, it is legitimate to conclude that the convergence 
of presidential and parliamentary elections has become one of the distinctive features 
of the Fifth Republic and a yet another instrument shaping the logic of French semi-
presidentialism. Looking from this point of view, it can be stated that the Fifth Republic has 
undergone a significant evolution, the final stage of which seems to be the consolidation of 
both types of elections as specific pro-presidential instruments. Initially, there was no such 
convergence. After the beginning of the alternance periods and before 2002, such an effect 
was achieved only after conducting presidential elections and taking immediate decisions 
to dissolve the first chamber on the basis of Article 12 of the Constitution. This mechanism, 
however, was used in practice only in the 1980s. In the next decade, parliamentary elec-
tions were held in the middle of presidential terms (both during the second presidency of 
François Mitterrand and the first presidency of Jacques Chirac). The absence of electoral 
convergence in this period was undoubtedly the result of the then political configurations, 
because no relevant normative reforms were introduced. In this respect, the fundamental 
change took place at the beginning of the 21st century when parliamentary elections began 
to be carried out immediately after presidential ones. In line with expectations, the former 
have always ended with favourable results for political camps headed by newly elected heads 
of state. This in turn entailed consolidation of the formula of a pro-presidential majority 
fact which, against the backdrop of constant changes in political configurations taking 
place in the 1980s and 1990s (frequent periods of cohabitation), has become the preferred 
political formula. What is most important, however, is that such a construction has begun 
to be sustained thanks to specific legal provisions. All this leads to the conclusion that the 
phenomenon of artificially achieved electoral convergence (provided that presidential 
elections are conducted first) may be perceived as yet another factor contributing to the 
emergence of a highly presidentialised political environment determining the current shape 
of the French semi-presidentialism.
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